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CASEWESTERNRESERVEJOURNALOF INTERNATIONAL LAW 51 (2019) 
TALKING FOREIGN POLICY: 

RESPONDING TO ROGUE STATES 

"Talking Foreign Policy" is a one-hour radio program, 
hosted by the Dean of Case Western Reserve University School 
of Law, Michael Scharf, in which experts discuss the important 
foreign policy issues. The premier broadcast (airdate: March 1, 
2012) covered the controversial use of predator drones, 
humanitarian intervention in Syria, and responding to Iran's 
acquisition of nuclear weapons. Subsequent broadcasts have 
covered topics such as the challenges of bringing indicted tyrants 
to justice, America's Afghanistan exit strategy, the issue of 
presidential power in a war without end, and President Obama 's 
second term foreign policy team. This broadcast focused on the 
responding to rogue states. 
The purpose of the radio show is to cover some of the most 
salient foreign policy topics and discuss them in a way that can 
make it easier for listeners to grasp. "Talking Foreign Policy" is 
recorded in the WCPN 90.3 Jdeastream studio, Cleveland's 
NPR affiliate. Michael Scharf is joined each session with a few 
expert colleagues known for their ability to discuss complex 
topics in an easy-to-digest manner: 
•The ambassador: Todd F. Buchwald, former Ambassador for 
Global Criminal Justice and Assistant Legal Adviser for U.N. 
Affairs, and current fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International 
Center for Scholars; 
•The prosecutor: James Johnson, former Chief of Prosecutions 
of the Special Court of Sierra Leone and current the Director of 
the War Crimes Research Office at Case Western Reserve 
University; 
•The international law guru: Milena Sterio, Associate Dean of 
The Cleveland Marshall College of Law; and 
• The negotiator: Paul R.. Williams, president of the Public 
International Law and Policy Group. 
Archived broadcasts (both in audio and video format) of 
"Talking Foreign Policy" are available at: 
https://law. case. edu/TalkingForeignPolicy. The transcript of 
the September 17, 2018 broadcast appears below. 
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TALKING FOREIGN POLICY: RESPONDING TO ROGUE STATES 
SEPTEMBER 17, 2018 BROADCAST 1 
MICHAEL SCHARF: Welcome to Talking Foreign Policy, I'm your host, 
Michael Scharf, 2 Dean of Case Western Reserve University School of 
Law. In this broadcast, our expert panelists will be discussing the 
issue of responding to Rogue States. For our program today, we've 
assembled a panel of experts on peace negotiations, national security, 
human rights and war crimes. Joining Talking Foreign Policy for the 
first time is Todd Buchwald, who served as the State Department's 
Ambassador for Global Criminal Justice and Assistant Legal Adviser 
for U.N. Affairs, and he is currently a fellow at the Woodrow Wilson 
International Center for Scholars. 3 I've known the ambassador since 
we worked together at the State Department twenty-five years ago, so 
I will dispense with the formalities and just say: Welcome to our 
show, Todd. 
TODD BUCHWALD: Great to be here. 
MICHAEL SCHARF: And we are also joined by another new guest, 
James Johnson, 4 who served as Chief of Prosecutions of the Special 
Court of Sierra Leone after a two-decade career in the U.S. JAG 
Corps. He is currently the director of the War Crimes Research Office 
at Case Western Reserve University. Welcome Jim. 
JAMES JOHNSON: Thank you, Michael. 
1. 	 Transcript edited and footnotes added by Cox Center Fellows Nicole 
Divittorio, George Kamanda, Alexandria McKenna, and Alex Lilly. 
2. 	 Michael Scharf, CASE WESTERN RESERVE SCHOOL OF LAW (2019), 
available at https:/ /law.case.edu/Our-School/Faculty-Staff/Meet-Our­
Faculty/Faculty-Detail/id/142. Michael Scharf is the Dean of Case 
Western Reserve University School of Law. He has also written and 
published extensively in the area of international law. 
3. 	 Todd F. Buchwald, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE (2019), available at 
https: / /2009-201 7.state.gov/r/pa/ei/biog/251248.htm. Prior to 
becoming a career lawyer in the Department's Office of the Legal 
Advisor, Ambassador Buchwald served in the Office of White House 
Counsel and as an associate at Washington law firm Wilmer, Cutler, 
and Pickering. 
4. 	 Jim Johnson, CASE WESTERN RESERVE SCHOOL OF LAW (2019), available 
at https:/ /law.case.edu/Our-School/Faculty-Staff/Adjunct-Faculty. Jim 
Johnson served as Chief of Prosecutions of the Special Court of Sierra 
Leone after a two-decade career in the Jag Corps. He is currently the 
Director of the War Crimes Research Office at Case Western Reserve 
University. 
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MICHAEL SCHARF: And we have two Talking Foreign Policy regulars 
back with us today. First, Dr. Paul Williams, 5 the president of the 
Public International Law & Policy Group, a Nobel-Peace-Prize 
nominated NGO that has provided legal counsel in a dozen peace 
negotiations over the past twenty-two years. Welcome back to the 
show, Paul. 
PAUL WILLIAMS: Michael, it's great to be back. 
MICHAEL SCHARF: And also with us in the WCPN 90.3 Ideastream 
Studio is Professor Milena Sterio, 6 who is the associate dean of 
Cleveland Marshall College of Law and a renowned international law 
expert. It's good to have you back on the program, Milena. 
MILENA STEREO: It is great to be here, Michael. 
MICHAEL SCHARF: So, let me kick things off by asking Ambassador 
Todd Buchwald-how would you define what is a Rogue State? 
TODD BUCHWALD: Well, it's very interesting. It's not really a legal 
term and it doesn't really have a fixed meaning. 7 For the most part, 
it's been used as a way to talk about States that don't abide by 
norms on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and 
terrorism. 8 That's the way it was used early on by the Clinton 
5. 	 Paul Williams, AMERICAN UNIVERSITY wASHINGTON COLLEGE OF LAw 
(2019), available at 
https:/ /www.wcl.american.edu/community/faculty/profile/pwilliams/bi 
o. Paul Williams is a professor at American University Washington 
College of Law. He is also the president of the Public International Law 
& Policy Group, a Nobel-Peace-Prize-nominated NGO that has provided 
legal counsel in a dozen of peace negotiations over the past twenty-two 
years. 
6. 	 Milena Sterio, CLEVELAND MARSHALL COLLEGE OF LAW (2019), available 
at https:/ /www.law.csuohio.edu/newsevents/featuredfaculty/milena­
sterio. Milena Sterio is the Associate Dean of Cleveland Marshall 
College of Law and a renowned international law expert. 
7. 	 The definition of "Rogue States" is not fixed. It once referred to States 
that had "failed to adhere to the rule of law." Now, "it has become an 
elastic catchphrase that is used to demonize behavior and rally political 
support." Robert S. Litwak, A LOOK AT... Rogue States, WASH. POST 




8. 	 Post-Cold War Policy Isolating and Punishing "Rogue States", 
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administration; though, at some point, the Clinton administration 
made a concerted effort to stop using the word because they thought 
it was interfering with their ability to conduct diplomacy with 
countries on the list, like North Korea, who they engaged with. 9 In 
the Bush administration, it came to be used in association with the 
famous Axis of Evil countries. Again, it was about terrorism and 
weapons of mass destruction. 10 There was sort of a background noise 
to the whole thing-that you might be a target for regime change at 
some point-in the air. That was in the Bush administration. In the 
Trump administration, President Trump has used the term when he 
spoke to the U.N. General Assembly last year, and he added 
Venezuela to the list.11 And that was interesting because it's a 
different kind of Rouge State. I mean, one can easily see that it's not 
a very comfortable State to deal with. But it was different in the 
sense that unlike most of the [Rogue] States, its rngueness was 
directed internally rather than externally. So, that's the way it's used. 
I think, by and large, the term is still about externally-directed 
threats. 12 
MICHAEL SCHARF: I think you have coined a new phrase that we may 
be using today, rnugeness. So, based on the rogueness criteria, let me 
ask our expert panel: Which countries in the world do you all consider 
to be Rogue States? 13 Todd, let's start with you. What would be on 
your list? 
TODD BUCHWALD: I still tend to think of the States as the security 
threats. The security rogues. Maybe because of my background as an 
international lawyer, those are the States that tend to have the more 
immediate ... 
MICHAEL SCHARF: So, the worst ones on your list would be? 
9. 	 Litwak, supra note 7. 
10. 	 Massimo Calabresi, The Axis of Evil Is It For Real?, TIME (Feb. 3, 
2002), 
http:/ /content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,198894,00.html. 
11. 	 Remarks by President Donald Trump to the 72nd Session of the United 
Nations General Assembly (Sept. 19, 2017), available at 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president­
trump-72nd-session-united-nations-general-assembly/. 
12. 	 Litwak, supra note 7. 
13. 	 Robert Rotberg, The Threat from Rogue States, BOSTON GLOBE (Nov. 
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TODD BUCHWALD: Well, the worst ones on the executive branch's list 
would still be Iran... you would have thought North Korea; there's sort 
of a strange relationship now with North Korea. But, those two are 
probably at the top of the list. 
MICHAEL SCHARF: Paul, what would you add? 
PAUL WILLIAMS: Oh, I would definitely keep North Korea on the list, 
and then I would add the triumvirate of Syria, Sudan, and Burma, or 
Myanmar, as they like to be called. All highly destabilizing both 
internally and externally. 14 
MICHAEL SCHARF: And Milena, what would you put on the list? 
MILENA STERIO: For some historical perspective, you might go back 
to, for example, Libya under Gaddafi15-certainly at the end of that 
regime. And I certainly agree with both Paul and Todd regarding 
their lists. You might go back and say Serbia or the F.R.Y.-Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia-under Milosevic, as well. 16 
MICHAEL SCHARF: But not currently in either of those cases? 
MILENA STERIO: Not currently. 
MICHAEL SCHARF: Okay, and Jim: Is there anything we are leaving 
off? 
JAMES JOHNSON: Well, I think that I might add-I don't think Paul 
mentioned it-Yemen. I think I might add Yemen to that list. 
MICHAEL SCHARF: Okay. So, what about Cuba? Would any of you 
put Cuba on that list? Todd? 
TODD BUCHWALD: It is a funny kind of list to be put on because you 
don't know what it is that happens when you're on it. I think the 
relationship with Cuba, probably at this point, has a highly political 
14. 	 Id. 
15. 	 David E. Sanger and Judith Miller, Libya To Give Up Arms Programs, 
Bush Announces, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2003), 
https:/ /www.nytimes.com/2003/12/20/world/libya-to-give-up-arms­
programs-bush-announces.html. 
16. 	 See Michael P. Scharf, The Indictment of Slobodan Milosevic, 4 ASIL 
INSIGHTS 3 (June 5, 1999), 
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dimension to it-but I think it really is a little bit different than the 
other States on the list.17 
MICHAEL SCHARF: What about Turkey? Things are getting pretty out 
of control in our relations with Turkey. 18 Would you put them on the 
list, anybody? 
MILENA STERIO: I wouldn't. When I think of Rogue States, I also 
think of States that are willing to, essentially, flagrantly act rnguely. 
That might be a new word, too. 
MICHAEL SCHARF: So, like, invading another country, sending 
internet attacks into other countries ... 
MILENA STERIO: Invading another country, using chemical weapons, 
and things of that sort. 
MICHAEL SCHARF: What about Russia? 
MILENA STERIO: Well, Russia actually is very good at using 
international law rhetoric to justify its actions. Russia doesn't stand 
up and say, "Oh we don't care about international law." 
MICHAEL SCHARF: So, is a Rogue State only one that says, "We don't 
care about the rules?" 
MILENA STERIO: Well, the other difference I think is if we are 
defining rngueness, are we talking about it from the United States 
perspective, or are we talking about it from some objective, global 
perspective? 
MICHAEL SCHARF: What's the difference? 
MILENA STERIO: Well, there is a difference. There are States that are 
clearly threats, perhaps, to the U.S. And when we talk about, for 
example, Turkey, you might say, "Okay, U .S.-Turkey relations are 
really at a low point right now. But from a global perspective, I don't 
think Turkey is on the same level as Syria, for example, or some of 
these other States." 
17. 	 Claire Felter and Danielle Renwick, U.S.-Cuba Relations, COUNCIL ON 
FOREIGN RELATIONS (Jan. 19, 2018), 
https:/ /www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-cuba-relations. 
18. 	 Colin Dwyer and Larry Kaplow, What's the Deal with The Deepening 
Dispute Between U.S. And Turkey? NPR (Aug. 13, 2018), 




CASE WESTERN RESERVE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 51 (2019) 
Talking Foreign Policy: Responding to Rogue States 
MICHAEL SCHARF: Okay. So, focusing on those states that are threats 
to the United States that you've listed. Paul Williams: Why should 
the US care particularly about these countries? 
PAUL WILLIAMS: Well, I think, Michael, there are two reasons why 
the United States should care about Rogue States. The first is that 
they directly impact our security. The United States has security 
interests woven throughout the globe, and when you have States­
either by the strict definition of rejecting the norms relating to 
terrorism, or as the broader definition of rngueness that we seem to be 
establishing here-this impacts our ability to maintain the security of 
the United States and our allies. 19 So, for instance, with North Korea 
and its nuclear weapons, you know it has the ability to annihilate 
South Korea and Japan and possibly the ability to strike the United 
States. Syria pushing millions of refugees into Lebanon, Jordon, 
Turkey and into Europe-it's highly destabilizing. 20 Turkey might 
not be rogue, but is certainly on the verge of being destabilized, and 
there are security consequences. 21 So, the States acting outside the 
bounds of the normative structure that the Americans have worked 
for over the decades to create substantially impacts our interests. 
Second, I think it's important to add that if they impact their own 
populations as well, that's also something Americans used to-and 
should continue to-care about. Burma has pushed out 700,000 of 
their own civilians into Bangladesh. And some would call this-what 
they've been doing-genocide. 22 This is something that may not 
impact our security interests, but we should care about it. 
MICHAEL SCHARF: Okay, so with most of the countries we have been 
talking about, it's the government itself that is acting roguish. What 
about those countries where there are terrorists, or rebels, or pirates 
that are operating freely because they are failed states? Milena, do 
19. 	 Mara Karlin, After 7 Years of War, Assad has Won in Syria: What's 
Next for Washington?, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (Feb. 13, 2018), 
https: / /www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/02/13/after-7­
years-of-war-assad-has-won-in-syria-whats-next-for-washington/. 
20. 	 Kemal Kiri§ci, Jessica Brandt, and M. Murat Erdogan, Syrian Refugees 
in Turkey: Beyond the Numbers, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (June 19, 
2018), https:/ /www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from­
chaos/2018/06/19/ syrian-refugees-in-turkey-beyond-the-numbers/. 
21. 	 Sebnem Koser Akcapar, Turkey Stands Between Europe and the Next 
Refuge Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2018), 
https: / /www.nytimes.com/2018/09/25 /opinion/syria-idlib-refugees­
turkey-war-erdogan-putin-assad. html. 
22. 	 Myanmar Rohingya: What you Need to Know About the Crisis, BBC 
(Apr. 24, 2018), https:/ /www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-41566561. 
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you think there is a difference between a Rogue State and a failed 
State? 
MILENA STERIO: Sure. I think definitely there is a difference, as you 
correctly stated. Most of these Rogue States that we just mentioned 
are ruled by governments that have effective control over the territory 
of those States. A few years ago, maybe Syria was in a different 
category, but right now President Assad has control over most of the 
Syrian territory. 23 Other presidents of the States that we have 
mentioned have control over their territory. A failed State, to the 
contrary, is a State where the government no longer exercises effective 
control over their territory, which then allows groups like non-State 
actors, terrorists, pirates, rebels, and narco-traffickers to operate with 
impunity. 24 And the classical example of a failed State would be 
Somalia, where- about ten years ago-pirates were basically free to 
roam because there was no effective government oversight. 25 
MICHAEL SCHARF: So, whether we are talking about a failed State or 
a Rogue State, let me ask the ambassador: When is it better for the 
U.S. to act in concert with others through the U. N. or NATO, and 
when do you feel it's necessary for the United States to consider 
acting on its own? 
TODD BUCHWALD: Well, I think in principle, it's always better to act 
with others and in as large a coalition as possible. If you have this 
picture of a Rogue State as a State that is playing out of the accepted 
lines, if you're in concert with others, it's clear you're able to more 
clearly demonstrate where those lines are. So, if we're the only one 
saying, "You're playing outside the lines," it doesn't resonate nearly 
as much as if the entire international community makes that claim. 
Now, when you talk about the international community, it's a 
concept; you can't touch the international community. You could be 
talking about the U .N. General Assembly or the U .N. Security 
Council; if it's a situation in Europe, you could be talking about 
NAT0. 26 There are times, however, when it won't be possible to act 
multilaterally, and I think the United States will always reserve to 
23. 	 Karlin, supra note 19. 
24. 	 Failed States, GLOBAL POLICY FORUM (last visited Nov. 1, 2018), 
https:/ /www.globalpolicy.org/nations-a-states/failed-states.html. 
25. 	 Hassan Barise, Somalia Where Pirates Roam Free, BBC (Nov. 11, 
2005), http:/ /news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4424264.stm. 
26. 	 Ian Black, NATO Alerted to Dangers of Rogue States, THE GUARDIAN 
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itself at least the prospect of acting unilaterally, if for no other reason 
than you have to reserve that prospect as part of the campaign of 
building a multilateral coalition. 
MICHAEL SCHARF: And I think you're mostly talking about use of 
economic sanctions and use of force. Let me turn to Jim Johnson. As 
an international prosecutor, when should prosecution of leaders of 
Rogue States be considered and pursued? 
JAMES JOHNSON: Well, first, Michael, let me just state that your 
question assumes that there might be an international tribunal or 
some judicial body that is capable of carrying out a prosecution. 
Unfortunately, in many instances-you look around the world 
today-with leaders this may not be the case. But there is clearly the 
precedent developed by Nuremberg and reinforced by the modern 
tribunals that makes it clear: war crimes and crimes against humanity 
are committed by individuals. And as a head of State, you are 
responsible; and, as a head of State, you have no immunity from 
international crimes. So, indeed, you can be prosecuted. And when 
you're looking at when you should be prosecuted, I'm a prosecutor 
and that's first and foremost in my mind. I believe that when there 
are reasonable grounds to believe that a leader has committed a war 
crime or crime against humanity, that action should be taken towards 
the prosecution of that leader. Beyond that, you also are going to 
want to look at the gravity of the crimes that have been committed. 
Also relevant is the location of the victims? Are they internal or 
external? These are some of the kinds of things that you look at, I 
think, when you are prosecuting a leader. 
MICHAEL SCHARF: Well, we are almost out of time for our first 
segment. When we return, we will focus our discussion on the case 
study of Syria, the greatest humanitarian crisis facing the world in the 
last decade. 27 We'll be back in just a moment. 
---- (Station break} ---­
MICHAEL SCHARF: Welcome back to Talking Foreign Policy brought 
to you by Case Western Reserve University and WCPN 90.3 
ldeastream. I'm Michael Scharf, the Dean of the Case Western 
Reserve University School of Law. I'm joined today by the former 
U.S. Ambassador for Global Criminal Justice, Todd Buckwald; the 
international prosecutor who convicted Liberian president Charles 
Taylor for war crimes, Jim Johnson; famed peace negotiator, Dr. Paul 
27. Syria: The Biggest Humanitarian Crisis of Our Time, AMNESTY 
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Williams of the Public International Law & Policy group; and an 
international law guru, Associate Dean Milena Stereo of Cleveland 
Marshall College of Law. We are talking today about the challenges of 
responding to Rogue States. In this segment of our show, I'd like to 
focus the group's attention on the crisis in Syria. Since the beginning 
of the civil war there in 2011, the Assad regime has killed and 
displaced millions of people, and on several occasions the regime has 
used chemical weapons in opposition-controlled areas. Syria has 
become the greatest humanitarian crisis of our time. 28 Let me begin 
by asking ambassador Todd Buckwald: Why hasn't the U.N. Security 
Council been able to take action to respond to the growing crisis in 
Syria? 
TODD BUCHWALD: Under the U.N. Charter, if the Security Council 
takes a decision, all U.N. member states-basically every country in 
the world-is under a legal obligation to accept and carry out the 
decision. 29 That's Article 25 of the U .N. Charter. 30 The U .N. Security 
Council has five permanent members: the United States, the United 
Kingdom, France, China, and Russia. And, the way the Charter is 
structured, a decision can only be taken if all five of the permanent 
members concur in that decision. 31 And, of course, in the last several 
years Russia-acting as protector of the Syrian client state-has 
vetoed a number of resolutions, including a resolution to refer the 
situation in Syria to the International Criminal Court and a variety of 
other resolutions related to Syria that were favored by us and many 
other countries. 32 
MICHAEL SCHARF: So, what is it about Syria that Russia likes so 
much? They do have a port in Tartus; is that important to them? 33 
28. 	 Eyder Peralta, UN: Syrian Crisis Is 'Biggest Humanitarian Emergency 
of Our Era, NPR (Aug. 29, 2014), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2014/08/29/344219323/u-n­
syrian-refugee-crisis-is-biggest-humanitarian-emergency-of-our-era. 
29. 	 What is the Security Council?, UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL, 
http:/ /www.un.org/en/sc/about/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2018). 
30. 	 Repertory of Practice of United Nations Organs Supplement, 
Supplement No. 10 (2000-2009), 
http://legal.un.org/docs/?path=.. /repertory/art25/english/rep_supp10 
_ vol3_art25.pdf&lang=E. 
31. 	 United Nations Security Council Fast Facts, CNN (Mar. 28, 2018), 
https: / /www.cnn.com/2013/09 /03 /world/united-nations-security­
council-fast-facts/index.html. 
32. 	 Syria: Does Russia Always Use a Veto at the UN Security Council?, 
BBC (Apr. 16, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-43781954. 
33. 	 Frank Gardner, How Vital is Syria's Tartus Port to Russia?, BBC (Jun. 
27, 2012), https:/ /www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-18616191. 
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TODD BUCHWALD: Yes that's important to them. What's also 
important to them is their influence in the area, and I think it's 
partly a way to demonstrate that they have to be met on their terms. 
There have been lots of proposals to get around-lots of ideas for 
getting around-the Russian veto. 34 There are ideas to amend the 
Charter of the United Nations to take away or limit the use of the 
veto. The political reality is that I don't think there's a way around 
it. The Security Council veto is hard-baked into the Charter. I think 
in the reality of that, leaders-more and more-will come to other 
ways of organizing international efforts. In Syria it's hard to do 
anything effective because the Syrians, basically, are winning the war, 
and that's the reality that lawyers and policymakers in Washington 
are having a hard time dealing with. 35 
MICHAEL SCHARF: But the U.S. has taken matters into its own hands: 
on April 6th, 2017, the U.S. fired 56 cruise missiles at a Syrian airbase 
after Syria deployed sarin gas in the town of Kahn Shaykhun near 
Damascus. 36 And then, on April 14th, 2018, the U.K., the U.S., and 
France together fired a hundred and five cruise missiles at Syrian 
chemical weapons production and storage facilities after the Syrian 
government deployed chlorine gas in the Damascus suburb of Duma. 37 
Milena, do most governments and legal experts believe that these air 
strikes were lawful under international law given the Security 
Council's paralysis because of Russia's veto? 
MILENA STERIO: I think that most governments and legal experts, as 
of now, do not believe that these airstrikes were lawful under 
international law because international law has a very basic norm 
which is a prohibition on States to use force against other States. The 
only two well-accepted, well recognized exceptions to that ban are 
situations where there is Security Council approval for the use of force 
34. 	 Louis Charbonneau, Dozens of Nations Back French Appeal to Limit 
Use of U.N. Veto, REUTERS (Sept. 30, 2015), 
https:/ /www.reuters.com/article/us-un-assembly-veto­
idUSKCNORU30V20150930. 
35. 	 Why Assad is Winning the War in Syria, PBS (Apr. 14, 2018), 
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/why-assad-is-winning-the-war-in­
syria. 
36. 	 Michael R. Gordon, Helene Cooper and Michael D. Shear, Dozens of 
U.S. Missiles Hit Air Base in Syria, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2017), 
https:/ /www.nytimes.com/2017/04/06/world/middleeast/us-said-to­
weigh-military-responses-to-syrian-chemical-attack.html. 
37. 	 Syria Air Strikes: US and Allies Attack 'Chemical Weapons Site', BBC 
(Apr. 14, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east­
43762251. 
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and self-defense. 38 And, as Todd just told us regarding Syria, there is 
no Security Council authorization, nor will there be one in the near 
future, because of the Russian and, perhaps, Chinese veto. 39 So the 
Security Council is a no-go in this situation. And it's very hard for 
the U.S., the U.K., and France to argue that they acted in self-defense 
because Assad was using the chemical weapons only against Syrian 
citizens, in areas where there were no U.S., U.K., or French forces 
nearby. One argument that some scholars, and I know you, Michael, 
are starting to talk and write about this, is this idea that 
humanitarian intervention is another exception to this ban on the use 
of force. 40 And so, unless we're willing to accept this idea of 
humanitarian intervention without Security Council authorization as 
an exception to the use of force, it is hard to legally justify the 
airstrikes. 
MICHAEL SCHARF: People have been talking about this for almost 
twenty years. Paul, for example, you participated in the negotiations 
at Rambouillet to try to avert the Kosovo conflict. And after the 1999 
NATO airstrikes against Serbia to halt the ethnic cleansing of the 
Kosovo Albanians, the U.N. did endorse something called the 
"responsibility to protect," or R2P doctrine. 41 Does that doctrine 
permit unilateral humanitarian use of force like the airstrikes on 
Syria? 
PAUL WILLIAMS: Well Michael, my sense is that we're very close to 
having international acceptance of a legal doctrine which permits the 
unilateral use of force. As Todd has pointed out, Security Council 
authorization is hard-baked into the U.N Charter, but it's being 
rampantly abused by the Russians to provide cover for states like 
Syria who are committing mass atrocities against their civilians-you 
know, four, maybe 500,000 killed by the regime. 42 Milena properly 
38. 	 U.N. Charter, art. 2, para. 4; U.N. Charter, art. 51. 
39. 	 Syria War: Russia and China veto Sanctions, BBC (Feb. 28, 2017), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-39116854. 
40. 	 Sarah Almukhtar, Most Chemical Attacks in Syria Get Little Attention. 
Here Are 34 Confirmed Cases, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2018), 
https:/ /www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/04/13/world/middleeast/sy 
ria-chemical-attacks-maps-history.html. 
41. 	 Responsibility to Protect, U.N. OFFICE ON GENOCIDE PREVENTION AND 
THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, 
http://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/about-responsibility-to­
protect.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2018). 
42. 	 Note to Correspondents, Transcripts of Press Stakeout by United 
Nations Special Envoy for Syria, Mr. Staffan de Mistura, United Nations 
Secretary-General, Apr. 22, 2016, available at 
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pointed out that the doctrine was created to allow for States to 
intervene when a country was unable or unwilling to protect its 
population, or where it was actually, in fact, carrying out those 
atrocities. 13 The early versions of R2P require Security Council 
authorization. But, I think we've seen in Kosovo there was a 
humanitarian intervention by NATO with no Security Council 
authorization. 43 We've now had two interventions: first, by the 
Americans, and then by the Americans along with the French and the 
British in Syria, where there was no Security Council authorization. 44 
I think the flagrant violation of its responsibilities by Russia at the 
U.N., coupled with this increasing trend of countries massacring their 
own civilians, is definitely tipping the scales in the direction of some 
type of souped-up responsibility to protect which will no longer 
require authorization by the Security Council. And quite frankly, 
Mike, that day cannot come soon enough. 
MICHAEL SCHARF: So, about 70 countries around the world chimed in 
with support of the U.S./U .K./French air strikes on Syria last April. 
The only countries that were against it, quite frankly, were Russia 
and Syria, and then China joined in. 45 Do this overwhelming support 
and other factors indicate that something is changing, as Milena 
pointed out? Let's unpeel the onion and see how this new case might 
be different than other cases. So, first of all, let me ask the panelists 
at large: Does it matter that this case was about chemical weapons 
use and the targets were chemical weapons facilities, as opposed to­
in the other cases-other types of crimes against humanity where the 
targets were broad military and governmental targets? In the Serbia 
case, they just bombed anything that was a military target, right?46 
So, does that make a difference, Todd? 
https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/note-correspondents/2016-04­
22 /note-correspondents-transcript-press-stakeout-united. 
43. 	 Djamchid Momtaz, NATO'S "Humanitarian Intervention" in Kosovo 
and the Prohibition of the Use of Force, INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF 
THE RED CROSS, No. 837 (Mar. 31, 2000), available at 
https: / /www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/article/other/57jqcr.ht 
m. 
44. 	 Syria: Does Russia Always Use a Veto at the UN Security Council?, 
BBC (Apr. 16, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-43781954. 
45. 	 Hannah Elis-Peterson, et al., World Reacts to Overnight Strikes on 
Syria by US, UK, and French Forces, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 14, 2018), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/apr/14/airstrikes-syria­
world-reacts-bombing-us-uk-french-forces. 
46. 	 Brent Sadler and Christiane Amanpour, NATO Attack on Yugoslavia 
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TODD BUCHWALD: I think, whether rightly or wrongly, with the way 
international law works it does make a difference. I think clearly 
something's changing, and peoples' willingness to accept this kind of 
thing is way higher, and goes up more and more, because of all the 
atrocious behavior we see in Syria. Whether a new legal rule emerges 
is not necessarily the same question. When you look at the way the 
president talked about what he had authorized, he didn't really talk 
about it in terms of humanitarian intervention concepts. He talked 
about it in terms, like you're talking about, of the special threat that 
weapons of mass destruction pose to U.S. security. 47 He's dealing with 
it in a situation where U.S. troops are already in the theatre. And it 
seems to me that, in a not completely elegant way he's groping for a 
self-defense kind of explanation for what he's doing. But what's 
interesting is that he's justifying what he's doing by an appeal to a 
humanitarian doctrine. But some scholars have opined that if the real 
rationale were humanitarian intervention, there were probably ways 
to save more lives than bombing those chemical facilities. If the idea 
is to get your most humanitarian bang for the buck, this wasn't it. 
There's a different explanation for why this happened. That's at least 
one way to look at it. 
MICHAEL SCHARF: Milena? 
MILENA STERIO: The other thing that I would mention that's really 
important regarding this particular intervention in April of 2018 is the 
rhetoric used by the States-particularly the U.K. The U.K. 
government specifically talked about humanitarian intervention and 
how this was legal under that doctrine. 48 When you go back to the 
Kosovo case, the State Department was very explicit that Kosovo was 
sui generis; it wasn't supposed to create any kind of a precedent. 
They said "these were unique circumstances. We're not arguing that 
humanitarian intervention is actually legal." In the Kosovo case, 
others talked about how that intervention was legitimate but not 
legal, and there was moral authority for it even if there wasn't legal 
47. 	 Full Transcript of Tramp's Address on Syria Airstrikes, WASH. POST 
(Apr. 13, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post­
politics/wp/2018/04/13/full-transcript-of-trumps-address-on-syria­
airstrikes/?utm_term=.c0ded632acl 1. 
48. 	 UK's Theresa May Tells Lawmakers: Syria Strikes Were Legal and 
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authority. 49 Now, the U.K. government is saying: "this is 
humanitarian intervention, this is legal." And the U.S. government is 
basically making statements like, "we're in complete agreement with 
the U.K." 50 
MICHAEL SCHARF: Let me ask you, so Nikki Haley, the ambassador to 
the United Nations from the United States, said that at the Security 
Council. There is a doctrine in international law that if a country 
adopts another country's position or other group's positions-if they 
ratify it-they can be held to be responsible for it. Isn't this kind of 
language that Nikki Haley used, when she said "we are in lockstep 
and in complete agreement with the U .K." isn't that close to a case of 
adoption under that doctrine? 51 The adoption doctrine was once used 
in the International Court of Justice in the case of Iran's adoption of 
the student protestors' attack and takeover of the U.S. embassy. The 
International Court of Justice said the government of Iran is now 
responsible because they applauded that action, and because they said 
that they agreed with it. How is this any different? 52 Todd? 
TODD BUCHWALD: I think Nikki Haley's words reflected a sort of 
purposeful ambiguity. "We're in lockstep with them" is another way 
of just saying we were supportive of our allies. If you go back to the 
1999 NATO intervention in Serbia, that is when the United Kingdom 
first said that humanitarian intervention was lawful. 53 The U .K. used 
the doctrine again to justify the imposition of no-fly zones to protect 
Kurds and Shi'ites in Iraq. They had their theory, which was a 
humanitarian intervention theory. And the U.S. had its our own 
theory, which was not based on humanitarian intervention. To me, 
what I see going on is a long history of the United States coming up 
49. 	 See David Lefkowitz, On Moral Arguments against a Legal Right to 
Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention, 20 PUB. AFF. Q. 115 (Apr. 2006), 
http:/ /www.jstor.org/stable/40441432. 
50. 	 Steven A. Engel, Memorandum Opinion for the Counsel to the 
President, April 2018 Airstrikes Against Syrian Chemical-Weapons 
Facilities (May 31, 2018) (slip opinion), available at 
https://www.justice.gov/olc/opinion/file/1067551/download. 
51. 	 Nicole Caouette, Richard Roth and Elizabeth Joseph, Haley Says US 
'Locked and Loaded,' Prepared to Maintain Pressure on Syria, CNN 
(Apr. 14, 2018), https:/ /www.cnn.com/2018/04/14/politics/un-meeting­
syria-strikes/index.html. 
52. 	 See United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. 
Iran), Judgment, 1980 I.C.J. Rep. 3 (May 24), available at 
https: / /www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/64/064-19800524-JUD-O1-00­
EN.pdf. 
53. 	 Marc Weller, Syria Air Strikes: Were They Legal?, BBC (Apr. 14, 
2018), https:/ /www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-43766556. 
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with a different rationale, other than humanitarian intervention, to 
justify its actions. For it to be real customary international law, state 
officials are going to have to stand up and say, clearly, "this is what 
we think." 
MICHAEL SCHARF: Paul, what do you think? 
PAUL WILLIAMS: Michael, I think the Brits have this right. The Brits 
realize that in today's world, you're going to need to engage in 
humanitarian intervention in cases like Kosovo and cases in Syria for 
your own national security and also just to protect, quite frankly, 
humanity. The Americans, for decades, have been dodging this 
question. The silliness of, "it's illegal but it's legitimate" and any 
possible rationale we could come up with. Quite frankly, it's time for 
the U.S. government-and I think the Trump administration to a 
degree, has-to embrace that doctrine.22 The U.S. Department of 
Justice Office of Legal Counsel opinion on the Syria airstrikes talked 
about the relationship between the humanitarian catastrophe from 
use of chemical weapons against civilians and U.S. security interests, 
so the United States is inching towards humanitarian intervention. 
But it's time for the Americans to be serious; we are doing 
humanitarian intervention. Let's create a legal framework, like the 
British have, for those interventions. Let's do it in a limited 
circumstance, with limited scope, with as little force as possible, but 
let's create a legal framework around it. Let's not have it run free 
range around the globe because that's when the Russians, the 
Chinese, and others will take advantage of a wobbly legal doctrine. 
MICHAEL SCHARF: I will note that Harold Koh, who was the former 
legal advisor at the State Department, has chastised both the 
Democratic and Republican administrations of the United States for 
not being specific when they do humanitarian intervention and doing, 
instead, what Todd was describing54-having these factors, and saying 
it's sui generis, which means there's no precedent, just "this is an 
exceptional case." Koh said the risk of the U.S. approach is that 
other countries will abuse the precedent because the U.S. is creating a 
very amorphous precedent. It's not that they're creating no precedent, 
which is what-I think-the U.S. hopes is happening. Instead, they 
are creating a precedent, but it's one where they are letting the genie 
54. 	 See Harold Koh, Humanitarian Intervention: Time for Better Law, 111 
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out of the bottle and people can interpret it in all different ways. I 
think that's what you're getting at. Is that right, Paul? 
PAUL WILLIAMS: Yes, the Russians have used a version of this 
humanitarian intervention for their intervention in South Ossetia, 
Abkhazia, and Crimea, Eastern Ukraine. None of those are 
humanitarian interventions that would be justified by the U .K. 
rationale. 55 
MICHAEL SCHARF: But the answer is not to say, then, that there 
shouldn't be any humanitarian interventions, but to cabin it off with 
some very precise rules. 
PAUL WILLIAMS: Right. 
MILENA STERIO: Well Michael, Russia is citing the Kosovo 
precedent, 56 although the State Department is saying it's not a 
precedent. 57 
MICHAEL SCHARF: This is Harold Koh's point. 
MILENA STERIO: Exactly. And Harold Koh said that we, as lawyers, 
shouldn't be-I think he called us "potted plants. "58 That it is our 
duty to get out there. 
MICHAEL SCHARF: Get out there first and articulate clear doctrine. 
MILENA STERIO: Exactly. 
PAUL WILLIAMS: We're creating precedent, let's stop pretending we're 
not creating precedent. 
MICHAEL SCHARF: So, one of the lawyers in the studio is an 
international prosecutor. Let me bring Jim Johnson back into the 
conversation. Jim, what is being done to pave the way for war crimes 
55. 	 Marc Weller, Analysis: Why Russia's Crimea Move Fails Legal Test, 
BBC (Mar. 7, 2014), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe­
26481423. 
56. 	 Irina Filatova, The Kosovo Precedent, GUARDIAN (Feb. 23, 2008), 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2008/feb/23/ thekosovopr 
ecedent. 
57. 	 Id. 
58. 	 Harold Koh, Syria and the Law of Humanitarian Intervention (Part III 




CASE WESTERN RESERVE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 51 (2019) 
Talking Foreign Policy: Responding to Rogue States 
trials of President Assad and others in Syria that are using chemical 
weapons, that are using barrel bombs, that are torturing people-and 
seem to be getting away with it? 59 
JAMES JOHNSON: Well, Michael, as we mentioned a few minutes ago, 
one of the concerns right now is that for many of these leaders of 
rogue regimes, there is no option to prosecute them-as in the case of 
Syria. 60 
MICHAEL SCHARF: What about the European countries which have 
launched prosecutions of Syrians based on universal jurisdiction in 
their national courts? 61 Is that working? 
JAMES JOHNSON: There have been some cases brought against lower 
figures but they have not pursued a case against President Assad as 
he is protected by Head of State immunity. And when you look from 
an international perspective, there does not seem to be an option to 
prosecute him. 62 Attempts to either create an ad hoc tribunal, or to 
refer this case to the International Criminal Court, have been vetoed 
by Russia and others in the Security Council. But that doesn't mean 
that steps are not being taken. The most critical element of cases of 
war crimes and crimes against humanity is to get in and to collect 
and preserve the evidence. 
MICHAEL SCHARF: And that's being done? 
JAMES JOHNSON: That is being done, and initiatives are taking place 
to help that process along. First, really, since the start of the war in 
Syria, several NGO's have been attempting to collect and gather 
evidence in Syria and, most importantly, to preserve that evidence. 
And, now, the United Nations has taken steps. The General Assembly 
has established the International Independent and Impartial 
Mechanism, which has been created to collect, collate, and preserve 
evidence of war crimes in Syria-so that eventually, if there is a 
59. 	 Terry Atlas, Hawkish Advisors Get Key Trump Roles, ARMS CONTROL 
ASSN. (May 1, 2018), https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2018­
05 /news/hawkish-advisers-get-key-trump-roles. 
60. 	 Eliza Mackintosh, War Crimes Prosecutor Quits Syria Inquiry Over UN 
Inaction, CNN (Aug. 7, 2015, 7:57 AM), 
https:/ /www.cnn.com/2017/08/07/middleeast/syria-war-crimes­
investigator-del-ponte-resigns/index.html. 
61. 	 Maria Elena Vignoli, These are the Crimes We Are Fleeing: Justice for 
Syria in Swedish and German Courts, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Oct. 3, 2017), 
https:/ /www.hrw.org/report/2017/10/03/these-are-crimes-we-are­
fleeing/justice-syria-swedish-and-german-courts. 
62. 	 Id. 
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prosecution that can indeed take place, it will. 63 You look at the 
killing fields of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, for example: it was 
thirty years after they fell from power that Cambodia finally created 
a tribunal that could try the genocide in Cambodia. 64 
MICHAEL SCHARF: Meanwhile, if countries are getting impatient 
about prosecutions, I do note that Pulitzer prize winning journalist 
Bob Woodward's new book said that the White House had 
considered, seriously, the assassination of President Assad. 65 Let me 
turn to Paul: What's your take on that? What are the pros and cons 
of using assassination as a policy tool against rogue leaders? 
PAUL WILLIAMS: Wow, that'd be the ultimate humanitarian 
intervention. It's highly dangerous, it's highly unpredictable, and it's 
highly destabilizing. I think this would be a return to the bad old 
days of targeting individual leaders, which is something-although 
we're quite extensively engaged in targeting terrorist leaders-we've 
very much moved away from the days of targeting heads of State. To 
do so without a plan for State building, or without a plan for an 
alternative government, could be very dangerous and very 
destabilizing, and wouldn't accomplish the objective of stopping the 
atrocities on the ground. 
MICHAEL SCHARF: And I suppose it could turn the globe into a 
version of the Old West, where countries are just trying to assassinate 
each other's leaders left and right? 
PAUL WILLIAMS: Yes. 
MICHAEL SCHARF: Right, now there is a taboo against that. 
PAUL WILLIAMS: There is a taboo, and that taboo supports our 
strategic interests. 
MICHAEL SCHARF: Alright, well, it's time for another short break. 
When we return, we'll talk about some of the other rogue regime 
flashpoints around the world. Back in a moment. 
63. 	 G.A. Res. 71/248 (Dec. 21, 2016). 
64. 	 See Wolfgang Form, Justice 30 Years Later? The Cambodian Special 
Tribunal for the Punishment of Crimes Against Humanity by the Khmer 
Rouge, 37 J. NAT'L. AND ETHNICITY 889 (2009). 
65. 	 Ben Jacobs, Trump 'Wanted Assad Assassinated': Key Claims in Bob 
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---- (Station break} --- ­
MICHAEL SCHARF: This is Michael Scharf and we're back with 
Talking Foreign Policy. I'm joined today by some of the world's 
foremost experts on dealing with rogue nations. In this final segment 
of our broadcast, I want to ask our experts to discuss some of the 
other States that the Trump administration has labeled as rogue 
regimes, starting with Iran. 66 Paul Williams: Tell us why Iran should 
be on our radar as a rogue State. 
PAUL WILLIAMS: Well, Mike, if we were to employ Todd's rngueness 
scale, we'd find that the Iranians are at the top of the scale. When 
the Iranians aren't busy attempting to build a nuclear weapons or 
ballistic missile delivery systems for those nuclear weapons, they're 
overseeing tens of thousands of elite Iranian troops operating in Syria, 
fighting against the Syrian opposition, and committing atrocities 
against the Syrian people. They're also funding and directing 
Hezbollah and their operations inside Syria. 67 They're heavily engaged 
in Yemen, providing assistance and weapons to the Houthis. 68 They're 
providing ballistic missiles to the Houthis in Yemen that can reach 
Riyadh-and have reached Riyadh-the capital of Saudi Arabia. 69 
They still maintain a vast terrorist network throughout the Middle 
East and North Africa. 70 They basically are a highly destabilizing 
actor in the region. 
66. 	 At U.N., Trump Singles out 'Rogue' Nations North Korea and Iran, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2017), 
https:/ /www.nytimes.com/2017/09/19/world/americas/united-nations­
general-assembly.html. 
67. 	 Matthew Levitt, Hezbollah Finances: Funding the Party of God, WASH. 
INST. FOR NEAR EAST POL'Y (Feb. 2005), 
https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/hezbollah­
finances-funding- the-party-of-god. 
68. 	 Farzin Nadimi and Michael Knights, Iran's Support to Houthi Air 
Defenses in Yemen, WASH. INST. FOR NEAR EAST PoL'Y (Apr. 4, 2018), 
https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/irans­
support-to-houthi-air-defenses-in-yemen. 
69. 	 Stephen Kalin, Saudi Arabia Intercepts Missile over Riyadh: Al 
Arabiya, REUTERS (Apr. 11, 2018, 10:47 AM), 
https: / /www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-security/ saudi-arabia­
intercepts-missile-over-riyadh-al-arabiya-idUSKBN1Hl2SK. 
70. 	 Carol Morello, Terrorism is Down Worldwide, but State Department 
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MICHAEL SCHARF: Alright, well, the Iranians do sound, from that 
description, like the bad boys of the Middle East. We, until recently, 
had an Iranian nuclear accord, which the United Nations and the 
inspectors said was actually working. 71 Milena, why did the United 
States pull out of that? 
MILENA STERIO: The Iranian nuclear accord, which was signed back 
in 2015, provided essentially that Iran was temporally halted in its 
production of enriched uranium for military purposes. The accord was 
going to be valid for 15 years. In exchange for that, there was an 
easing and lifting of U .N. sanctions against Iran. 72 So, Iran had, 
definitely, a financial incentive to stay in the agreement. President 
Trump, back when he was candidate Trump, pretty often talked 
about the Iran agreement as a bad deal that he wanted to pull out of. 
And now he has announced that the U.S. is indeed pulling out. 73 
There doesn't seem to be a Plan B, so it's unclear what happens now 
in terms of U.S. policies vis-a-vis Iran. In terms of explaining why he 
pulled out of the agreement, some commenters think it was all about 
undermining President Obama's legacy. If you view the Iran 
agreement as one of the high points of the Obama presidency, it has 
to do with undermining that. 74 Also, it has to do with turning more 
strategically towards our allies such as Israel, and perhaps Saudi 
Arabia, 75 and the influence of some more hawkish advisors in the 
Trump Administration, such as, for example: Mike Pompeo, who is 
71. 	 Erin Cunningham, Iran Adhering to Nuclear Deal with World Powers, 




72. 	 William J. Broad and Sergio Pecanha, The Iran Nuclear Deal-A Simple 
Guide, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2015), 
https:/ /www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/03/31/world/middleeast/si 
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73. 	 Catherine Lucey and Josh Lederman, Trump Declares U.S. Leaving 
'Horrible' Iran Nuclear Accord, CHI. TRIB. (May 8, 2018), 
https:/ /www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/politics/ct-iran­
nuclear-deal-20180508-story.html. 
74. 	 Anthony Zurcher, Three Reasons Behind Trump Ditching Iran Deal, 
BBC (May 8, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada­
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now Secretary of State, and John Bolton, who is now the National 
Security Advisor. 76 
MICHAEL SCHARF: You said there didn't seem to be a Plan B, but 
prior to being appointed to the position of National Security Advisor, 
John Bolton did publicly advocate Israeli airstrikes against Iran's 
nuclear facilities. 77 Ambassador Todd Buchwald: what would be the 
pros and cons of either U.S. or Israeli airstrikes against those nuclear 
facilities? 
TODD BUCHWALD: Well, there are actual examples of the Israelis 
attacking nuclear reactors in Iraq in 1981, a reactor called Osirak. 78 
At that time, the United States actually condemned the Israelis, with 
President Reagan mitigating a little bit by saying the Israelis believed 
what they were doing was right. However, there was a clear 
condemnation. 79 There was another attack by the Israelis in 2007­
same idea, though it wasn't acknowledged until much later. 80 It's a 
hard situation. I think that legal concepts will only dictate to a 
certain degree, and not that great of a degree, what countries 
decisions will be in using force in situations where they feel themselves 
under existential threat. But, as a practical matter, if you're thinking 
about something like this, you'd have to think through the situation. 
Can the reactors be destroyed? What are the benefits? What are the 
costs? How are you going to mitigate the costs? And-very 
importantly-how is the world is going to react even if you can pull it 
off. And where you will end up on the rngueness scale? I think it's a 
lot easier to say-when you're out of government-that this is a good 
76. 	 Terry Atlas,_Hawkish Advisors Get Key Trump Roles, ARMS CONTROL 
ASSN. (May 1, 2018), https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2018­
05 /news/hawkish-advisers-get-key-trump-roles. 
77. 	 Vaughn P. Shannon, US Reaction to the 2009 Iranian Election: The 
End of "Regime Change" Politics, 26 J. IRAN. RES. AND ANALYSIS 47, 55 
(2009). 
78. 	 David K Shipler, Israeli Jets Destroy Iraqi Atomic Reactor; Attack 
Condemned by U.S. and Arab Nations, N.Y. TIMES (June 9, 1981), 
https: / /www.nytimes.com/ 1981/06/09/world/israeli-jets-destroy-iraqi­
atomic-reactor-attack-condemned-us-arab-nations.html. 
79. 	 Steven R. Weisman, Regan Asserts Israel Had Cause to Mistrust Iraq, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 1981), 
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idea, than to be in government and do it. I suspect that this is not 
really in the cards for the foreseeable future. 
MICHAEL SCHARF: I hope you're right about that. Paul Williams: 
Let's go to a slightly different part of the globe. You've been involved 
in peace negotiations in both Yemen and the Sudan. Can you bring us 
up to date on what the situation is in those countries and what policy 
options you would recommend for the United States with regard to 
them? 
PAUL WILLIAMS: As Todd pointed out, now that we're all out of 
government, we have lots of leeway to recommend policy options. So, 
I've got a few there. Both Yemen and Sudan have become never­
ending wars. In Yemen, in particular, you've got a three- or four-way 
conflict by the parties in Yemen. But it's been a spill-in conflict with 
the Iranians and the Saudis heavily engaged in supporting the parties, 
and the Americans, the British, and the French providing a lot of 
weapons to our allies: the Saudis, the UAE, and others that are 
engaged. 81 There are two problems with Yemen. One, there's no 
momentum for a peace process. Two, our allies-the Saudis-have 
incredibly bad aim, and thousands of civilians have been killed by 
American-made weapons. 82 It's time to bring an end to the conflict in 
Yemen. The Americans have a lot of leverage that they can put on 
the Saudis and the others to be serious about engaging the peace 
process. And, with the continued sanctions on Iran, there's also 
international leverage to get the Iranians to be serious. But, it's going 
to have to be the Americans, and their allies, which pressure our allies 
to come to the table and negotiate a peace. In Sudan, we've got 
nearly 30 years of conflict-this is the Darfur genocide, and it 
continues. 83 There's also expanded conflict in Southern Kordofan and 
Blue Nile. 84 This is a case where we actually have a tribunal that's 
engaged. The International Criminal Court has indicted the president 
of Sudan for crimes against humanity, and yet he wanders the globe 
unencumbered. 85 We need to be serious about putting pressure on 
81. 	 The Editorial Board, Why Are U.S. Bombs Killing Civilians in Yemen?, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 28, 2018), 
https: / /www.nytimes.com/2018/08/28/opinion/us-yemen-saudi-arabia­
trump-civilian-casualties.html?register=google. 
82. 	 Id. 
83. 	 Mohamed Nureldin Abdallah, Sudan Events of 2017, HUM. RTS. WATCH 
(Sept. 23, 2017), https:/ /www.hrw.org/world-report/2018/country­
chapters/sudan. 
84. 	 Id. 
85. 	 Where Can Sudan's President Omar al-Bashir Go Now?, BBC (June 15, 
2015), https:/ /www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-33140917. 
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countries like South Africa-and other countries which host president 
Bashir in the face of the International Criminal Court's arrest 
warrant-and threaten sanctions if they do not send Omar Bashir to 
the ICC to stand trial for crimes against humanity and genocide. 
Until we are serious about ending these conflicts, and until we use the 
leverage that we have, we are going to see these wars continue 
without end and continued genocide, crimes against humanity, and 
civilian casualties. 
MICHAEL SCHARF: Let me bring Jim in on that question. So, Jim 
Johnson: You have prosecuted a head of State, Charles Taylor, of 
Liberia, at the Special Court for Sierra Leone. As Paul mentioned, al 
Bashir, the president of the Sudan, has been indicted for genocide, 
and he just pops over to neighboring countries. He's even gone as far 
as China. 86 They allow him to come in as an honored guest. The 
International Criminal Court screams and yells, "he's under 
indictment, you have to arrest him, you have to send him to us," and 
nothing happens. The International Criminal Court, takes the case to 
the Security Council and says, "you're the Security Council, you sent 
this case to us, do something!" And they don't do anything. 87 What 
does this tell us about the state of international criminal justice? 
JAMES JOHNSON: Well, Michael, it doesn't necessarily tell us anything 
good. States have always and will continue to act in what they see is 
their best interest. One of the largest impediments that the modern 
international tribunals have had from the start-when you look at the 
Yugoslavia Tribunal, the Rwandan Tribunal, our tribunal, and now 
the ICC-is getting States to live up to their obligations to these 
tribunals. It took us three years to bring Charles Taylor into our 
custody after we indicted him. 88 
MICHAEL SCHARF: Well, fortunately international criminal law is 
patient and persistent. We're out of time. Todd Buchwald, Jim 
Johnson, Paul Williams, and Milena Sterio - thank you for your 
insights! This is Michael Scharf and you've been listening to Talking 
Foreign Policy. 
86. 	 Beijing Defends Sudan President Bashir's Presence at China-Africa 
Summit, AGENCIA EFE (Sept. 3, 2018), 
https:/ /www.efe.com/efe/english/portada/beijing-defends-sudan­
president-bashir-s-presence-at-china-africa-summit / 5 0000260-3737 446. 
87. 	 Toby Sterling, ICC Reports Jordan to U.N. Security Council for not 
Arresting Sudan's Bashir, REUTERS (Dec. 11, 2017), 
https: / /www.reuters.com/article/us-icc-sudan-jordan/icc-reports-jordan­
to-u-n-security-council-for-not-arresting-sudans-bashir-idUSKBN1E516C. 
88. 	 Craig Timberg, Liberia's Taylor Found and Arrested, WASH. POST 
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